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As cultural diplomacy is usually grounded in a 
set of values that state or non-state actors are 
expected to share, we opted for a preliminary 
study of the cross perception of fundamental Eu-
ropean values as they are perceived on the Arab 
side, with a limited scope and a selected theoret-
ical object that is the model of European political 
models and especially the European liberal de-
mocracy as perceived by the Arab intellectuals. 
The choice is motivated by a serious concern 
about the superficial statements which is often 
displayed by the past studies on public opinion, 
in order to know whether they approve or reject 
the European political model of democracy or 
whether the value promotion of European union 
can reach the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. 
How can we discard the simplistic mass media 
statements on the Islamic reluctance to democ-
racy and human rights etc., and the simplistic 
model of Clash of Civilizations carried out in the 
nineteen nineties, if we do not get back to the ori-
gin of the European-Arab interaction process1?   
By getting back to the nineteenth century, a pe-
riod when the Arab world had its intellectual 
“renaissance” (al-Nahda), we would be able to 
identify the deep roots of the Arab perception 
of European modern values, focusing on one of 
them in particular, “liberal democracy”. 
This is the first step in a presentation whose aim 
is to analyse the track of the Arab perception of 
the European political modernity, through the 
lenses of the Arab intellectual elite. 
This theoretical paper, based on compilations 
and literature analysis seems to be a first step 
enabling us to understand two phenomena: 
•  the perception, by the Arab public opinion of 
the European values related to democracy 
and human rights 
•  its perception of the way the European union 
is promoting them and developing its own 
public diplomacy. 
1 - The influence of European political 
models on Arab intellectuals during 
the “Nahda” as the starting point of the 
Arab perception of European values
The Arab cultural awakening started in the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century, when Egypt 
was just starting to build up its modern state, 
only two decades after the end of the French oc-
cupation. 
French occupation of Egypt lasted no longer 
than three years and brought in a lot of cultural 
transformation. It gave the Arab political actors 
the testimony that French republican Deism and 
Islam were close to each other. The Egyptians 
discovered that something was going wrong in 
their political organisation and in their political 
culture. Napoleon Bonaparte’s military occupa-
tion was sure bloody, but its short timeline and 
its positive interaction with the Egyptian reli-
gious authorities during the first period pushed 
Egypt forward to a modern model of statecraft2. 
It was no later than two decades after the end of 
Napoleon’s adventure in Egypt and Palestine that 
the Egyptian Khedive Muhammad Ali undertook 
the in-depth modernisation of the Egyptian state, 
thus encouraging a new generation of modern 
intellectuals to run for cultural hegemony on the 
Egyptian society3. 
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Rifâ’at Râfi’ al-Tahtâwi was among the pioneers 
of the nineteenth century’s Arab intellectual re-
birth. As a religious preacher, he was sent to 
France to supervise the Egyptian students’ del-
egation and ended up his journey with the redac-
tion of Takhlîs al-Ibrîz fi Talkhîs Bâriz (Extracting 
Paris’ Gold)4. 
Many new ideas developed by the author sup-
ported Muhammad Ali’s political reforms, as 
he advocated a modern state based on the al-
legiance to the Egyptian citizenship as a pillar for 
the political life and on equality for all citizens. 
These principles were echoing the French Re-
publican paradigm read through the lenses of a 
renewed Islamic thought. 
Nevertheless, Rifâ’at Râfi’ al-Tahtâwi’s political 
thought was not yet the cornerstone of the dem-
ocratic political doctrines in the Arab World. Me-
hemet Ali’s regime was true introducing political 
modernisation, citizenship and an accelerated 
industrialisation in Egypt. It represented never-
theless an authoritarian modernist experience, 
and the Khedive excluded from al-Azhar many 
Islamic top scholars too much supportive to de-
mocracy5. 
As a pioneer of the modern political thought in 
the Arab world, he was followed by many oth-
ers concerned with a new approach of political 
life, either by providing a new reading of the Is-
lamic intellectual and “theological” tradition, or 
through new doctrinal frames rather imported 
from Europe.
Jamal Al-Din al-Afghâni and his (disciple) Mu-
hammad ‘Abduh were concerned with reforming 
the religion Islamic doctrine so as to accom-
modate it with the requirement of modernity. So 
was the case of Khair al-Dîn al-Tûnisi and ‘Abdul 
Rahmân al-Kawâkibi whose writings were focus-
ing on how Islam and modern democracy are 
compatible. 
The Arab philosophers of the Nahda (The Arab 
cultural and intellectual awakening) were in the 
same time influenced by the European modern 
philosophy and reacting against cultural inertia 
in the Arab cities. They were more or less react-
ing against the Ottoman regime. Most of the Arab 
intellectuals and philosophers criticised the Ot-
toman rule but not all of them where hostile to it. 
For instance, Al-Kawâkibi’s negative perception 
contrasted with Al-Tûnisi’s reformist stance, the 
latter being an Ottoman notable, a troop com-
mander, and later on a member of Sultan Abdul 
Hamid’s government. Despite the divergence 
between those who rejected Ottoman rule and 
those who sought merely to reform it, one com-
mon feature between all of them was their call 
for a reform of the present political system. 
Al-Kawâkibi started with the critic of Ottoman 
despotism when he came to confront it to the 
European political model of organisation. He is 
assumed to have read the Arab commentaries 
of Rousseau and Montesquieu. He referred to 
the European political philosophies in addition 
to the European political economy and to the so-
cialist doctrines. 
Despotism is literally derived from the Arab verb 
“Istabadda” (meaning the individual exclusive 
appropriation of an action). This definition, used 
to describe the political power gives us a similar 
meaning: despotism is the appropriation of po-
litical power by the ruler in who takes decide on 
his own for the fate of a whole society and is not 
accountable to it6. 
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Al-Kawâkibi’s developments on despotism were 
determined by an East/West comparative ap-
proach. They were influenced by the European 
modern political philosophy’s theories on politi-
cal legitimacy.  The author referred many times 
the East/West contrast as did the European in-
tellectuals themselves. He emphasised the neg-
ative aspects of his own “eastern” society and 
political system in contrast with the Western one 
considered as a benchmark (if we use this ne-
ologism). 
Al Kawâkibi seemed to take on his own behalf 
the binary East/West opposition with regard to 
the political behaviour:  
“There are many differences between East-
erners and Westerners: the former has a 
better character taken individually, but the 
Westerner has a better relation to society. For 
instance, the Westerners always require from 
their Prince, loyalty to his responsibilities and 
respect of law, while in the Eastern societies 
it is the Sultan who orders his subjects to be 
loyal and obedient to him.”7
Therefore, the “Oriental despotism”8 seems to 
be the reason why Arab societies are perverted 
and backward. Despotism leads to immorality 
because it forces the despot’s subjects to sacri-
fice their own moral value in order to survive in a 
perverted environment. Moreover, despotism is 
not compatible with economic development be-
cause it brings insecurity in the economic field 
and is unable to provide the rules securing prop-
erty and private interests. 
This global critic of the Ottoman system contrast-
ed with the subtler approach provided by Al-Tûni-
si: the latter was rather aware of all the reforms 
undertaken by the Ottoman state since the mid-
dle of the ninetieth century9. Of course, the first 
radical reforms were carried out in Egypt, and the 
Egyptian experience was defeated when British 
and Ottoman struck back together against it in 
1840. But we should also remember that Istan-
bul was involved in a wide scale reformist pro-
cess with the many Tanzimats adopted since the 
fifties. Moreover, the Sultanate itself issued its 
own Ottoman constitution in 1876, introducing 
Ottoman citizenship with constitutional rights 
and obligations, as well as limited checks and 
balance between legislative and executive etc. 
That’s the reason why Al-Tûnisi’s critic was tar-
geting the Ottoman conservative leaders rather 
than the Ottoman political system as a whole10. 
How did the Arab philosophers refer to European 
political patterns? 
Both Al-Kawâkibi and Al-Tûnisi referred to the 
“representative democracy”, paradigm and their 
rationale consisted in finding the similarity with 
the original Islamic experience of Medina and of 
the first orthodox caliphates of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, 
‘Uthman and ‘Ali. 
Through mobilising historical and Islamic doctri-
nal resources, both of them argued the following: 
-  the political paradigm defined by the Quranic 
verses is that of the “Shûra” which means “de-
liberative system”. The Quranic verse (42;38) 
stipulates that all social issues should be sub-
mitted to a deliberation within the community 
of believers (Amruhum Shûra Baynahum). 
-  The practice of the first Muslim states con-
firms this doctrinal source as “Shûra” (delib-
eration) was implemented inside the city even 
when the Caliph was to set for new laws.
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-  This practice, based on Islamic ethics, privi-
leged the rule of law especially that this law, 
grounded on religious principles, is deemed to 
have authority on the rulers’ will, thus prevent-
ing any despotism. 
This was a difficult exercise made by the Muslim 
scholars at a time when the dominant political 
culture was based on the sole principle of obedi-
ence to the ruling elite “Awliyâ° al-Amr”11.
This is why we suppose that this return to the 
origins of Islam was at this time a result of a mir-
ror game between the Muslim intellectuals, the 
Arab-Islamic history and the European set of val-
ues. 
In this mirror game, the afore-mentioned intel-
lectuals are supposed to have been helped by 
the observation of the practical experiences in-
side the European political modernity in order to 
re-discover the original Islamic political system. 
Therefore they dissociated the historical sultan-
ates ruling them in an a more or less despotic 
way from the original democratic experience of 
the first Caliphates. 
The genuine historical research was undertaken 
by Al-Tûnisi who compared the Ottoman political 
system with the most representative European 
ones (from Russia to Great Britain). In each of 
them, he discovered a mixture of autocracy, aris-
tocracy and democracy, and many obstacles to 
the principle of equality. In his analysis he dis-
closed his preference for the French republican 
system, which was equality-oriented and reflect-
ed a better democratic representation than the 
other European regimes. 
This comparative approach was intended to es-
tablish that in each European political regime the 
key prerogatives were still laying in the hands of 
the “little few”, and still those “little few” repre-
sented the people directly or indirectly or were 
given a higher legitimacy due to their status or 
to their social or cultural position. This favoured 
the idea that in a reformed Islamic regime, the 
“deliberative” prerogatives could be attributed 
to those identified for their wisdom, their knowl-
edge or their political representativity, thus cor-
responding to the historical elite called “Ahl al-
Hal wa al-‘Aqd”. 
The key finding of Al-Tûnisi was this idea that 
the democratic reforms recommended for Tu-
nis province, and overall for the whole Ottoman 
state were, in the same, bringing the Arab po-
litical system close to the European democratic 
model and to the original Islamic principles for a 
political organisation. 
Furthermore, the principle laying beyond the idea 
of democracy was the principle of a civil govern-
ment disconnected from the idea of a God-given 
monarchy. The Arab philosophers concerned 
with the rebirth of Islamic political philosophy 
seemed to have read the many theories on so-
cial contract in order to abandon the principle of 
a theocratic political legitimacy. 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, a philosopher and religious 
scholar at the same time, benefiting from a solid 
reputation within the Egyptian religious institu-
tion, later on appointed as Mufti, supported the 
idea that the government in Islam is always a 
civil government, as he told that: 
“In Islam there is no other religious power 
given on people than the power of recom-
mendation and incitement to accomplish the 
right actions and to avoid the wrong ones, and 
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the least individual among the Muslim com-
munity is invested with this power over the 
most influent of them,… Islam has never given 
(the Caliph, the Mufti or the Cheikh al-Islam) 
any power on the beliefs and judgements of 
the individual, and any power given to them is 
only a civil power defined by the Islamic law, 
but which denies any  (sacred) authority on 
the faith and believes of the individuals”12. 
The secular idea spread on the aftermath of the 
abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate. In 1925, Ali 
Abdul-Râziq, an Egyptian Muslim cleric, present-
ed his theory of separation between the political 
system and the religious law, echoing the repub-
lican initiative of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. This 
was another form of European influence exerted 
through the intermediary of Turkey, which hosted 
the capital of the last Muslim state. 
Ali Abdul-Râziq argued that the doctrinal sourc-
es, Kuran and Hadith, provided detailed rules on 
marriage and inheritage, but not at all for any 
model of political organisation. The conclusion 
was that the Divine source left the issue of po-
litical organisation to the human civilisational 
course (al-‘Umrân al-Bashari)13. 
This interpretation provided the religious and doc-
trinal legitimacy for the secular, new political, thus 
providing the very basis for secular liberalism and 
nationalism all long the twentieth century. 
This influence of the European models worked 
through a mirror game where those Arab phi-
losophers, qualified as Islamic reformists, re-
discovered their original political Islamic model 
through the lenses of European modernity. 
Another question is linked to the problematic: 
how did those intellectuals perceive European 
societies? The statements expressed through 
the most famous writings disclosed a great deal 
of ambiguity: 
•  A negative perception of the European soci-
eties’ emancipation from traditional values 
was perceived as a form of civilisational de-
cay. While observing the French way of life 
al-Tahtawi who was advocating the woman’s 
emancipation in Egyptian society wished that 
this would not bring the latter to what he ob-
served in France when “sometimes men be-
came enslaved by women”.  Al-Kawakibi did 
the same when he said that the European “is 
materialist, tough in his relation to other peo-
ple, greedy, with a deep desire for revenge 
against them, as if nothing remained in his 
mind from the noble feeling transmitted by 
Christianity which is an Oriental religion”14.  
•  A positive perception on the same societies, 
because a just political system can always 
make people virtuous. In this sense, Muham-
mad ‘Abduh, on his way back from France and 
Italy said: “I went in Europe and I saw Islam 
without Muslim; I came back to my country 
and I saw Muslims without Islam.” He ex-
plained this aphorism by giving the details of 
the Islamic virtues the European citizen had 
and the Egyptian had lost.
This ambivalent statement determined to a cer-
tain extent the Arab perception of what could be 
borrowed from European culture and involved 
the Arab intellectuals in a deep insight of their 
own historical values. 
Islamic reformism as developed by Al-Tûnisi, 
Al-Kawâkibi and ‘Abduh was involved in this 
mirror game between self-perception and the 
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perception of the Other, where the present and 
contingent self  (qualified as decadent) is distin-
guished from the original self (considered as a 
paradigm).
2  - A simplified scheme of the Arab per-
ception of Europe at the colonial and 
post-colonial era
Muslim reformists had a balanced relationship 
with Europe, grounded on a mirror game at a 
time when their own state was still playing in 
the courtyard of the sovereign powers: Ottoman 
Empire, Egypt, etc. Their main concern was state 
reform in order to move forward to modernity.
In this sense, Europe, though threatening to ex-
pand at their expense, and though already con-
trolling in North Africa, served as a model of 
successful statecraft, and in the same time, as a 
place where the Arab political actors could find 
potential allies for their reforms. 
This perception changed with the evolution of 
the geopolitical environment. Therefore, two 
stages are identified: 
•  The stage of European colonisation of the 
Arab world changed radically this balanced 
perception of Europe, and the new concern 
was national liberation through confrontation 
with European colonialism. 
•  The next phase was post-colonial, and the 
relationship with Europe was reconsidered 
when the European political cooperation suc-
ceeded in transforming the European interac-
tion with the Arab world in a new form of co-
operation. 
This is the reason why we should analyse the 
evolution of the Arab intellectual and philosophi-
cal perception of the European political culture, 
political patterns, and diplomacy at each of 
these two stages.
How did the Arab intellectuals and philosophers 
who lived under the French or British occupation 
perceive these three dimensions? The question 
is addressed through the existential matrix of 
the Arab identity. During the late Ottoman era 
this matrix was Islamic reformism, because the 
main concern of the mainstream Arab intellectu-
als was the modernisation and democratisation 
(and decentralisation) of the Ottoman Islamic 
state. Europe was an ambivalent partner per-
ceived at the same time as a positive partner, a 
model and a threat. 
The colonial era led to a radical shift due to the 
new geopolitical context: 
•  Ottoman legitimacy disappeared next to the 
geographical split of the Ottoman state and to 
the abolition of Caliphate in 1924.
•  The Arab part of the Empire fell under the Eu-
ropean colonialism and was fragmented into 
as many states. 
•  The European colonialism helped feed the 
Arab fragmentation with a cultural dimension 
by encouraging if not producing micro-nation-
alism and minorities sectarianism15. 
As a consequence, getting rid of European co-
lonialism became the key concern expressed in 
the Arab philosophical and political literature. 
Therefore, the political matrix became the Arab 
nationalism, of which the main concern was the 
liberation of the Arab fatherland from European 
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colonialism, while taking assets from inside the 
European modernity in order to reform the Arab 
society. 
Arab nationalism was recent, but became the 
mainstream doctrinal basis in less than a dec-
ade16, and was nevertheless challenged by other 
alternative nationalisms (like Syrian national-
ism) and by pan-Islamism. 
The Arab nationalist matrix defines the relation-
ship with European states by correlating it to the 
positive objectives, which are liberation and uni-
fication of the Arab homeland. 
As a matrix, it was challenged by other substi-
tute nationalisms like the Syrian nationalism and 
also by non-nationalist projects of regional unity 
(non-nationalist unitarism), like pan-Islamism 
and Marxist Arab unitarism17.
In the following scheme we shall consider alto-
gether the original doctrine (Arab nationalism) 
and the alternative doctrines (pan-Islamism, 
Syrian nationalism and non-nationalist Arab uni-
tarism) altogether in order to determine the var-
iables of the Arab perception of European para-
digms and actors. 
If we correlate this perception with the geopo-
litical environment, and if we limit the reaction 
to each new situation to a binary option, that 
of course cannot not reflect the complex real-
ity, therefore we can infer six possibilities (from 
S1P1 to S3P3) supported by our readings and 
from our empirical knowledge on Arab history: 
Situation 1: Arab countries are subject to European 
colonialism: this leads to two different positions: 
Position 1: European states are ruling the Arab 
countries and this induces a general perception 
of a colonial Europe where the distinctions and 
internal contradictions are not perceived. 
This is often the case in the philosophical na-
tionalist discourse non concerned by the empiri-
cal study of intra-European contradictions. Most 
of the philosophical works published by nation-
alists consider the European actors as a homo-
geneous block when they come to describe the 
civilisational European offensive to uproot the 
Arab identity18. 
Position 2: European states are ruling the Arab 
countries, and the Arab discourse considers the 
antagonisms inside Europe. This was more the 
case of empirical studies and practical political 
discourse.  
In practice, this provided the case of Rasheed 
Ali al-Kaylani’s government in Iraq in 1941, who 
used to play the Axis against the ruling Britain, 
on the basis of the slogan “the enemy of my en-
emy is my ally”19. 
In another way, this is what the Marxists did by 
playing the contradiction between the European 
governments and the European working classes. 
Marxists sought for an alliance with the Europe-
an working class against the Imperialist projects 
of their own ruling class. 
Situation 2: Arab countries are already emanci-
pated from European colonialism and inserted in 
a regional system ruled by the bipolar conflict, in 
a context of United State-Israeli alliance20.    
Position 1: the Arab discourse perceives Western 
Europe and United States as part of a homog-
enous political axis, and still presents a binary 
perception of an East/West divide. 
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-  This discourse is rather developed by philo-
sophical and ideological writing of national-
ists, “pan-Islamists”, and Marxists, and dif-
fered from the empirical analysis.
-  Nevertheless, the radical “pan-Islamist” dis-
course considered that Western powers and 
the Soviet bloc were part of the same world21, 
while the Arab socialists and non-Maoist 
Marxists22  referred to the latter as an ally or a 
potential ally, by using the word “imperialism” 
to qualify the whole US-Western European al-
liance23.
Position 2: the Arab discourse does perceive the 
gap between United States and European diplo-
macy24, and therefore rejects the binary percep-
tion of an East/West cleavage and identifies the 
European diplomacy as a third actor. It expects 
from this European independent actor one of 
those possible attitudes: neutrality, mediation, 
positive partnership. 
-  As Arab nationalism considers that the strug-
gle ends up whenever the Arab national goals 
of liberation and unity are performed; there-
fore, there are not essential historical antago-
nists but only cyclical or temporary antago-
nists. In this case, the relationship with Europe 
is expected to be neutral or positive.
-  European common diplomacy since 1974 
started to move away from a policy of align-
ment on United States, and especially when 
next to the first oil shock the European re-
sponse consisted in establishing the Euro-
Arab dialogue25. 
Situation 3: Arab countries, though emancipated 
from European colonialism, are subject to do-
mestic violent conflicts. 
Position 1: The identity centred actors reject the 
European interference and identify it as a nega-
tive factor in the domestic conflict.
Position 2: Other political actors (focusing on 
democracy, minorities rights, etc.) seeks for Eu-
ropean support whether political, economic or 
cultural in order to resolve the domestic crisis, 
or in order to challenge the domestic antagonist.
The following simplistic scheme displays the six 
possibilities from S1P1 (Situation 1 Position 1) 
to S3P2. 
Situations/
positions
Arab perceptions of European 
political actors
P1 P2
S1: European 
Colonisation
Negative: 
East/West 
confrontation 
- European 
main target
Negative - 
displaying 
European/Eu-
ropean divere-
gences
S2: European 
Colonisation 
terminated
Negative: 
East/West 
confrontation 
- European as 
US allied
Positive - 
seeking for 
Euro-Arab 
cooperation
S3: Arab 
independence 
+ domestic 
conflicts
Negative: 
rejection of 
foreign inter-
ference
Positive - trap-
ping Europe 
into domestic 
conflicts
The optimal combination for the Euro-Arab rela-
tions was S2P2, which was correlated to the rise 
of a specific European Diplomacy, through the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC). And we 
choose to focus on this limited timeframe of the 
1973-1980 period to illustrate a typical S2P2 case. 
The rise of the EPC enabled this political coun-
terpart of EEC to build up the frame for a Euro-
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pean consensus in foreign policy, and this con-
sensus was influenced by the French Gaullist 
independent foreign policy as a drive, resulting 
in a European disagreement with the US Middle 
Eastern policy. 
The two key issues for this common foreign 
policy regarding the Arab world were the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the Euro-Arab dialogue.  
Concerning the first issue, EPC helped through-
out the nineteen seventies to bridge the gap be-
tween two edge-sided countries, Netherland and 
France: in 1967, while the Dutch government 
provided full diplomatic support to Israel, the 
French government supported the Arab claim 
for an Israeli withdrawal from recently occupied 
territories. At this time, France was almost the 
only EEC country to take her distances with the 
US policy of support to Israel. Six years later, in 
1973, the same diplomatic divide reappeared in-
side EEC, but the other four EEC members took 
their distance with the Dutch position, and this 
until the EPC mechanisms brought the EPC/EEC 
member into a consensus whereby the rights of 
the Palestinian people could be recognised, and 
we got the Venetia declaration26. 
The second key was the Euro-Arab dialogue, 
helping to bring a change in the perception of 
each block of the other one. The Arab oil embar-
go, as a mean to retaliate against foreign military 
and diplomatic support to the Israeli expansion, 
hurt United States in addition to one of the six 
EEC/EPC member states (Netherland). While the 
former responded to both by supporting a “con-
sumers’ cartel”, the latter was involved in an EPC 
dynamics moving toward dialogue with the Arab 
states. The Euro-Arab dialogue institution was a 
new form of recognition by the European partner 
of the relevance of the Arab identity and of the 
Arab claims. 
On the Arab side, the growing perception of Eu-
ropean Community at this stage, is summarised 
as follows: 
•  Europe is identified with European Community: 
in the political and intellectual discourse, there 
is a semantic confusion between them. 
•  Europe’s goals are perceived as being mainly 
economic, especially because in the Euro-
Arab dialogue, EEC partner emphasised on 
trade partnership with the Arab countries. 
This helped to weaken the image of European 
influence as a civilisational offensive aiming 
at dispossessing the Arabs from their own 
identity. In addition, this developed the realis-
tic approach in analysing European politics.
•  EEC than EU is perceived as a mediator in re-
gional conflicts, and as an alternative partner 
with or without limited hegemonic claims. This 
perception is strengthened by the relevance of 
common EPC then EU positions, and by the con-
sensual mechanism of decision making. 
This period of emergence of EPC, though disturbed 
by the latter evolution of the Euro-Arab relations, 
and by the disintegration of the Arab common 
strategies two decades later, left a long lasting 
footprint in the Arab collective imagination of what 
European Union could be.
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3 - The fate of European political para-
digms and the post-modernist inverted 
mirror game
A political antagonism does not prevent cultural 
influence, and this explains why European politi-
cal models and philosophical frames were still 
influential in the Arab world.
This means that while the Arab peoples were 
struggling against European colonialism, Arab 
political thought still borrowed concepts and 
paradigms from the European political thought 
and practice. 
Within the Arab national matrix, many political 
paradigms were competing, but sometime mixed 
during the first half of the Twentieth century: 
•  The traditional paradigm relied on the monar-
chic families’ legitimacy and on the traditional 
ruling class, but lacked all the resources to en-
gineer the new statecraft27.
•  The search for modernity was represented by 
two opposite trends: 
o The creation of European-like representa-
tive democracies though with many restric-
tions.
o The creation of a modern state through the 
paradigm of an authoritarian modernisation. 
The latter paradigm consisted in modernisation 
through an authoritarian top-down approach. 
Whenever implemented (Iraq 1941, Syria 1949, 
Egypt 1952, Tunisia 1956, Iraq 1958, Yemen 
1974, etc.) it worked on the basis of the follow-
ing assumptions28:
•  the Arab society needs to be modernised 
•  European modernity is still the available pat-
tern
•  The social structure is reluctant to modernisa-
tion
•  The society is modernised by a top-down au-
thoritarian state policy
This paradigm was supposed to be influenced 
by the Turkish republican model as it seems that 
Rachid Ali Al-Kaylani, Husni Al-Za’îm and ‘Ab-
dulkarim Qâsim, all of them being senior military 
officers and relying on the armed forces to ac-
cess to premiership, were inspired by this model, 
which on each turn borrowed its main principles 
and mechanisms from the experience of the Eu-
ropean modern state29. 
In this case, the modern European state is still a 
benchmark, but this time its authoritarian face 
is emphasised. This phenomenon displays the 
double edge of the modern statecraft: the liberal 
democratic edge and the authoritarian hierar-
chic edge; European history in the nineteen thir-
ties gives a lot of evidence of how we can shift 
from one edge to another30. 
In the authoritarian-modernist experience, both 
edges met in the same political system which 
paradoxically used the authoritarian paradigm in 
order to develop the modern set of values31.
This paradigm that is nevertheless derived from 
European modernity is obviously diverging to 
a great extend with the founding political para-
digm of European post World War II organisa-
tions32. The set of values inherent to European 
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political modernity contains the two opposite 
dimensions that are totalitarianism on one hand, 
and the values of European post World War II or-
ganisations which core is the European conven-
tion on human rights (ECHR) on the other hand. 
This human rights-based value system was at 
the beginning carried by the Council of Europe 
at a time when the European community was 
mainly trade oriented. It took more than half a 
century for the latter to integrate the objectives 
and mechanisms of the former through the im-
plementation of the European union charter of 
fundamental rights. 
The paradox of the Arab modernity is that many 
of the representative political doctrines were in-
fluenced by paradigms of European modernity 
while being in contradiction with the value set of 
European post World War II organisations and 
therefore of the European Union. 
Among the political paradigms, the so-called para-
digm of “popular democracy” was overwhelming in-
side the Arab landscape of the nineteen sixties and 
of the nineteen seventies (from Algeria to Iraq). Its 
very basis was the Marxist theory of class struggle 
whereby political legitimacy was relying on its class 
identity, and the authentic democracy reflecting the 
power of the working people’s alliance represented 
by the revolutionary vanguard. This perception de-
rived from the evolution of the Marxist theory adapt-
ed to the Arab nationalist doctrine was endorsed by 
the later Ba’th declarations (1966) as well as by the 
Nasserist National Charter (1964) and by the Na-
tional Liberation Front in Algeria33. 
Was this a European paradigm, as it became 
closer to the Soviet ideological paradigms even 
if Arab socialism was very different from the so-
viet party system? Whatever the answer to this 
question is, it was obviously the Soviet Union 
and not the European post-World War II organi-
sations that served as a benchmark for political 
regimes34. 
Meanwhile this was not an obstacle to improve-
ment of the Euro-Arab relationship, and one of 
the cases illustrating this fact is the strengthen-
ing French-Iraqi diplomatic and economic rela-
tionship since 197435. The Arab socialist percep-
tion of European union has changed and broke 
off with the former philosophical discourse 
since the establishment of the Euro-Arab dia-
logue, and since European common diplomacy 
diverged from the US-Israeli axis. If we use Nye’s 
typology, EPC diplomacy emphasised Economic 
power and soft power, and avoided hard power36. 
With the crisis of Arab socialism, two ideolo-
gies expanded among many others: revolution-
ary Marxism whose leaders and intellectuals 
blamed the fake socialism of the Arab national-
ists, and the so called “Islamists”, both aiming 
to reshape the perception of Europe among the 
public opinion. Both of them were opposed to 
Western political and cultural influence, whether 
American or European. 
Here we reach a paradox with the Iranian revolu-
tion, despite Iran being outside the Arab world. 
Nevertheless, its revolution influenced the Arab 
neighbourhood to a great extent. Among the 
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most famous intellectuals close to it, we have 
Ali Shariati whose works were based on the syn-
thesis of religious political doctrine and theory 
of class struggle in addition to Baqir al-Sadr who 
was an Iraqi philosopher and religious Muslim 
Shi’i cleric who tried to reject capitalism and 
socialism, and to overcome liberal and Marxist 
models of democracies37. 
The paradox provided from this junction of West-
ern influenced post-modernist philosophy reject-
ing all the conceptual frames of liberal democ-
racy with an Islamic revolutionary doctrine using 
a revolutionary and even “third wordlist” rhetoric. 
As Islamic values are not per se incompatible with 
European political values, and the political theo-
ries of the earlier Arab modern philosopher is an 
evidence of it, the “revolutionary Islamic thought” 
hostile to the contemporary European set of val-
ues was also echoing the radical post-modern Eu-
ropean violent critic of European modernity. 
European post-modernism’s roots stemmed from 
the core of the modern era, with the development 
of the critical philosophy, which instigated doubt 
on the fundamentals of modern rationalism, mod-
ern individualism, and liberal democracy. 
Among the most critical philosophers in Eu-
rope was Michel Foucault, whose rationale con-
sisted in demonstrating that the structures of 
the modern state of law are just a set of social 
mechanisms of controls that gives us the fic-
tion of autonomous and responsible individu-
als. Foucault’s judgement was met with the dy-
namics of the Islamic revolution in Iran, where 
he founded a revolution against the oppressive 
modernity38. 
A steadier alliance based on common concepts 
and doctrinal beliefs put together the radical 
Marxist anti-imperialist in the Arab world with 
the radical revolutionary Marxist in Europe. Both 
were very critical toward the European diploma-
cies toward the “Third world” and therefore to-
ward the Arab world. European common diplo-
macy was perceived as reflecting an unbalanced 
system where the Core as a whole (the dominant 
countries) exploited and dominated Periphery 
(the so called third world countries)39. This the-
ory didn’t get into the many details in order to 
identify which country did what, but perceived a 
cohesive “imperialist block” whose core was the 
United States. Economic partnerships between 
European Community (then European Union) 
and the Arab world were perceived as part of this 
exploitation process. 
We needed a more pragmatic approach to identify 
who did what in European Union in terms of posi-
tion toward both the US core and the Arab periph-
ery. As a matter of fact, two countries were known 
for their support for Arab liberation, and therefore 
for the Palestinian cause: Ireland and Greece. Both 
perceived themselves as peripheral colonised so-
cieties. Ireland because of the history of British co-
lonialism, and Greece because the Greek left and 
PASOK government defined their own country as a 
US-UK economic and political dominion40. 
Nevertheless, according to the culturalists, Marx-
ist theory was not really breaking off with Euro-
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pean cultural patterns41. That is the reason why 
some European sociologists called for an alterna-
tive to the “Westernisation of the World”42. This 
idea was at the same time echoing to and echoed 
by the identity-centred approach in the Arab world. 
Which stressed the need to restore the Arab civili-
sational patterns relegated by colonialism. 
Another philosophical project designed to face 
cultural alienation was Hassan Hanafi’s project 
of “Occidental Studies” or “Occidentalism” (Is-
tighrâb or ‘Ilm al-Istighrâb), which represented 
the symmetrical counterpart of the European 
“Orientalism”. The Arab self, instead of being de-
termined by the Western perception, should have 
his own knowledge of the Western civilisational 
patterns.
The Arab project of “Occidentalism” or “Occiden-
tal sciences” is made to give them the opportu-
nity to be the subject of a knowledge process 
after they have been for a long time the object of 
European social sciences43. 
This “Occidentalism” paved the way for the same 
critic of modernity. Instead of advocating post-
modernity, it presented it as a process of disinte-
gration for most of the basic principles of moder-
nity (Rationality, individuality, democracy, etc.). 
“Occidentalism” defines itself as a scientific ap-
proach, and its aim is to analyse the genesis and 
context of the European philosophies, doctrines 
and cultures. This enables the Arab scholar to 
understand them better instead of spreading ste-
reotypes, or just repeating what he was taught on 
Europe about European culture. 
Among the Arab scholars, the “Occidentalists” 
are those who have the most seriously identified 
the problematic of post-modernity, and the way 
Europe has overthrown its own modernity matrix 
through the post-modernist critic during the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century.
This enables us to understand that another mir-
ror game replaced the one described  above for 
the nineteenth century: 
-  In the Nahda mirror game, the European mo-
dernity was discovered as a mirror to the origi-
nal Islamic model the Arabs have lost through-
out their history.  
-  In the contemporary Post-modern mirror 
game, the rejection of European modernity by 
the Arab radical revolutionary (whether Marx-
ist of “Islamist”) echoed the same attitude 
among the European post-modernist revolu-
tionaries. 
But as in Europe, post-modernism is nowadays 
replaced by a new combination of assertive mo-
dernity and National-Christian revivalism, the 
gap between Europe and the Arab world is now 
widening in the sense that the Arab intellectuals 
who have in the past echoed the European post-
modernists are still, while the European post-
modernist counterpart is fading at the benefit of 
a new aggressive self-assertion. In a few words 
the other side of the mirror is broken, and the 
gap is widening. 
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4  - The new liberal consensus: Back to 
the initial Nahda mirror game 
The Euro-Arab mirror game is also played at the 
level of the Liberal doctrines here and there. The 
rise of post-modernity in the West and of radical 
revolutionary doctrines in the Arab world over-
shadowed, for a while, the liberal doctrines devel-
oped since the Nahda. A crucial moment would 
have been the lost opportunity for a Euro-Arab 
consensus, and it can be called the “Fukuyama 
moment”44, meaning the time when the political 
actors and intellectuals of both sides believed 
that the return to the liberal democracy as it is 
defined in Western Europe was the condition for 
any positive transition in the other parts of the 
World. 
On the European side, the revisit of modernity’s 
core values enabled a move back from post-mod-
ern relativism to universalist rationalism. And this 
went altogether with an assertive support of the 
paradigm of liberal democracy, which the many 
European and American think tanks defined as 
the only possible paradigm of democracy45.  
On the Arab side, the task was not to revisit a lib-
eral democracy they could not really experience, 
except for brief periods in a few countries (Syria 
during the fourties and the fifties), but to deter-
mine the historical and political conditions for a 
liberal democratic transition. 
Therefore, many liberal intellectuals focused on 
the analysis of the obstacles to the democratic 
change rather than on democracy itself. They tar-
geted the Arab authoritarian state, and focused 
on understanding how it works and especially 
how it survived to the third wave of democracy. 
And the repeated question was: why is the Arab 
world still reluctant to democratic transition?
An answer to these questions relied on  theo-
ries on oppressive state that is still resisting to 
change, with many theoretical models we only 
present three of them: 
•  The theory of  the rentier state: A state based 
on a non-productive system: the theory of au-
thoritarian rentier state explained the mech-
anism of authoritarian state consolidation 
through the use of the oil rent, and how the 
oil rent inverted the relationship between the 
citizen and the government46.  
•  The theory of the state/civil society schizo-
phrenia: A state working as an autonomous 
environment, with its elites, its economy, its 
own culture, acting like an alien for the civil 
society which is only the exploited-oppressed 
side of the relation47. 
•  The theory of neopatrimonial state whose re-
sources are privatised and shared by ruling 
families48. 
The European mechanisms of liberal democ-
racy are here working as positive terms of the 
comparison, without working as models that the 
Arab people should imitate. At the same time, 
the key values of human rights protection are 
recognised as universal.
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This common belief is deemed to be the ground 
for a European-Arab cultural consensus on hu-
man rights and on the founding principles of 
liberal democracy. The return of the liberal ideol-
ogy was concomitant to the crucial shift in EU 
diplomacy based on “political conditionality”, ac-
cording to which the economic aid is linked to 
the respect by the aid recipient of human rights 
and democratic standards. This seemed to yield 
some positive results in sub-Saharan Africa. But 
why did it not work with the Arab world? 
In order to understand the situation, let us con-
sider the “Algerian paradox”, where the full im-
plementation of democratic mechanisms in 
1989 gave a landslide victory to the Islamic Sal-
vation Front – whose ideology was radically hos-
tile to the very basis of liberal democracy – and 
where the protection of the key values of moder-
nity went through the military return to power, at 
least for a while, in 1992. 
As a consequence, the liberals discussed the 
paradox of a “democracy without democrats”49, 
meaning that the social conditions for a safe and 
steady democratic system are still absent, thus 
trapping them into the following paradox: Sup-
porting the authoritarian models of government 
in order to protect the values of Arab modernity.
This was the ultimate trap for the EU principle of 
democratic conditionality, and this explains why 
these crises were avoided by the EU actors who 
just managed to get involved into a realpolitik dis-
regarding the guiding principle. But this couldn’t 
work and the Arab intellectuals highlighted its 
contradictions: realpolitik, when democracy was 
risky, was combined with democratic conditional-
ity when the regimes were unfriendly (Sudan, Syria, 
Iraq), this bringing a high level of discredit for EU. 
The other issue is that the Arab side doesn’t 
understand the way EU institutions work when 
it comes to the defence of democratic and hu-
man rights values. Here visibility is an essential 
matter, and many divergences appear when the 
European Parliament takes a position that is not 
endorsed by the Council, or vice-versa, or when 
a consensus between member states is out of 
reach. 
Another consequence of this paradox was that 
many liberal intellectuals moved to another field: 
the re-interpretation of the religious doctrine in 
order to confront the closed dogmatic interpre-
tation with new enlightened doctrines50.  
The crucial opportunity for reaching is undenia-
bly the “Arab spring”. We will call it “Tahrir Square 
consensus”. This consensus gathered the main 
Arab political doctrines (liberal, Marxist, nation-
alist and “Islamist”) who agreed on democratic 
mechanisms as a matrix for any political sys-
tem. This was supposed to bridge the gap be-
tween the European post-WWII organisations’ 
values (i.e. liberal democracy) and the Arab new 
elite and to consolidate a new universal “demo-
cratic consensus”51. 
Efficiency of the EU policies of support to de-
mocracy is more visible in a new-born democ-
racy. As evidenced by consolidation of the 
common liberal model is that the European 
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Neighbourhood policy includes the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR)52. 
Many factors led to the hypothesis that this op-
portunity is lost again as the move from demo-
cratic protest to crisis, civil war and humanitarian 
disaster has induced many political dilemmas 
among the European actors. All of them re-
sulted from the S3P3 case, where the EU actor 
is trapped in a domestic Arab conflict by Arab 
friendly political actors, but are about to lose 
their credibility in the eye of the Arab side. 
•  In the case of Egypt: Human rights claims or 
state stability and economic recovery53? 
•  In the case of Libya: Interfering in state build-
ing or caring only about the European com-
mon borders and protecting the sole oil facili-
ties?
•  In the case of Syria: Ignoring the humanitarian 
disaster, selecting the crucial issues for Euro-
pean security or getting politically involved?
•  Extended to Turkey: The double standard in 
dealing with repression in Egypt and Turkey 
was sharply criticised. 
•  The rise of the conservative discourse focus-
ing on protecting Christian minorities (while 
more than 90% of victims of terrorism are 
not), and on welcoming only Christian refu-
gees as it was told by four EU governments 
(true out of twenty-eight). 
Another factor is now changing the sense of his-
tory: the democratic standards are now ques-
tioned inside the European union by the rising 
combination of nationalism and Christian radi-
calism. This new political landscape and also 
the Hungarian experience lead us to the remake 
of the Algerian paradox: the “demos” is enabled 
to reject the standards of liberal democracy, this 
time in favour of a nationalist- religious oriented 
authoritarianism. 
This change in paradigm has not yet produced all 
its effects inside the Arab intellectual landscape, 
but its very probable effect would be a new dis-
credit to the liberal paradigm. If deeply rooted 
inside the societies, this change can bring three 
crucial elements that can be easily perceived on 
the Arab side: security at the expense of liberty, 
identity-centered islamophobia and a religious 
oriented foreign policy54. Nowadays, this move is 
reaching many of the member states, but not the 
EU institutions. At least, the dichotomy between 
an EU human rights centered initiative and the 
identity-centered policies of the member states 
will be more and more visible. 
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